The Handover Without a Handbrake: Who Answers for England's New Devolution Deals?
Photo by Photo by Izyan Sultanali on Unsplash on Unsplash
British devolution has never been an event. It has arrived in instalments — Scotland and Wales in 1999, London in 2000, the first combined authorities from 2011, and a decade of deals since, each accompanied by a promise that decisions would be taken closer to the people they affect. The 2026 round of settlements was unveiled with the familiar choreography: a visit to a transport interchange, a press release counting billions, and a claim that Whitehall would finally loosen its grip.
In Focus Dialogue convened a panel to test that claim: three metro mayors from different parties, two council scrutiny chairs from authorities inside combined authority areas, and a professor of constitutional law. Over ninety minutes the disagreement was real, but the diagnosis was strikingly cross-party. The powers have moved. The accountability has, at best, been posted second class.
Money that arrives wearing a label
The mayors were, to a person, warmer about the fiscal settlement than about anything else in the package. Longer funding horizons and a reduction in the number of separate grant competitions represent a genuine improvement on the annual bidding rounds that once consumed entire policy teams. One mayor described the shift as 'the difference between planning a bus network and applying for permission to plan one'.
But the panel was blunt about the limits. Much of the new money remains hypothecated — earmarked for specific outputs, often with reporting requirements written in Whitehall — and the flexible portion is modest relative to the responsibilities attached to it. Business rates retention, the flagship of fiscal devolution rhetoric, continues to distribute reward unevenly, favouring areas with a strong commercial base and penalising authorities whose tax base was hollowed out long before the deal was signed.
A scrutiny chair put the point sharply: 'We are told we have fiscal freedom, and then we are handed a spreadsheet with thirty columns that we did not design.'
The scrutiny deficit
Overview and scrutiny has become the fault line of English devolution. Combined authority committees are, in most areas, thinly resourced, lightly staffed and dependent on the cooperation of the very executives they are meant to examine. Statutory officers can be called, but the duty to attend is uneven; papers can be requested, but deadlines are often set by the executive itself.
Several panel members noted that the problem is structural rather than personal. Where a mayor governs with a small cabinet and a large personal mandate, the scrutiny function has no equivalent electoral weight behind it. Councillors nominated to combined authority committees frequently keep their main party roles in their home authorities, which makes independent-minded challenge harder than it looks on paper.
The constitutional lawyer on the panel went further, arguing that English devolution remains a grant rather than a right: powers are conferred by order, can be conditioned, and can in principle be withdrawn. That asymmetry shapes behaviour. 'A mayor who knows the settlement can be amended from London,' she said, 'negotiates differently from one who knows the settlement is entrenched.'
The audit gap between announcement and outcome
The panel returned repeatedly to the question of measurement. Devolution deals are announced against inputs — money committed, powers transferred, boards established — but are rarely judged against outcomes residents can recognise: journey times, skills attainment, housing completions, wage levels.
The Office for Local Government has begun to build a comparative evidence base, and the audit bodies have steadily sharpened their scrutiny of combined authority accounts. Yet the public conversation remains dominated by the announcement rather than the result. One mayor conceded the point with a candour that surprised the room: 'If we were honest, we would publish a single page each year saying what we promised, what we delivered, and what we got wrong. Almost nobody does.'
What accountability would actually require
The panel converged on a small number of practical reforms, none of them constitutionally exotic.
First, a statutory footing for English devolution, replacing the current patchwork of orders with a framework that sets out powers, conditions and — crucially — the circumstances in which they can be removed.
Second, scrutiny funding written into the settlement itself, ring-fenced and scaled to the size of the budget being overseen, with an independent chair appointed through a process the executive cannot control.
Third, a published outcome framework agreed with local authorities and revised on a fixed cycle, so that failure is visible early rather than discovered at election time.
Fourth, a genuine role for residents beyond the ballot box — citizens' assemblies with a formal right to be answered, and annual public sessions at which the mayor accounts for the year's decisions rather than celebrating them.
A paradox, not a dead end
The devolution paradox is real but not fatal. More powers without more accountability does not produce tyranny; it produces drift, defensiveness and a slow erosion of public trust in the very institutions devolution was meant to renew. The mayors on the panel were not asking to be shielded from scrutiny. They were asking for scrutiny that is resourced, informed and stable enough to be useful.
That is a modest ask, and a testable one. If the 2026 settlements are to be judged fairly, the measure should not be how many functions left Whitehall, but whether anyone outside Whitehall can now say, with evidence, whether the result was worth the money.